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During the second half of the eighteenth century, government administra-
tors and entrepreneurs in different parts of Mediterranean Europe em-
ployed a mix of Enlightenment ideas and advanced technology to revitalize
the economies of their countries. These reformers denounced the secular
stagnation of the Mediterranean world, a stagnation they described as both
an economic and a cultural—or, as they put it, moral—phenomenon.
Political and social advancement, they thought, would follow naturally
from economic liberalization and the introduction of new technologies. In
the end, of course, the modernization of Mediterranean Europe proved a
slow and difficult process. The diffusion of modern machinery through the
landscape, technology transfer from one region to another—these were not
straightforward tasks.
Reformers focused in particular on olive oil production, by far the most
important commercial activity in the region.1 In the second half of the
eighteenth century a sizable international market for olive oil developed,
and certain enlightened reformer-entrepreneurs advocated rationalizing
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1. The single most important export of the kingdoms of Portugal and Naples, olive
oil was also crucial to the economies of the French and Italian Rivieras. Silk throwing was
also important in these regions, although much less widespread. On the mechanization
of silk throwing, see Walter English, “A Study of the Driving Mechanisms in the Early
Circular Throwing Machine,” Textile History 1 (1971): 65–75, and Carlo Poni, “The Cir-
cular Silk Mill: A Factory before the Industrial Revolution in Early Modern Europe,” His-
tory of Technology 21 (1999): 65–85. On other aspects of silk technology, see Simonetta
Cavaciocchi, ed., La seta in Europa (Florence, 1993).
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and mechanizing oil production as a way of meeting this increased
demand. The economic importance of olive oil in European markets ex-
tended well beyond its uses in the kitchen; it was also the best industrial
lubricant available and the most efficient fuel for lighting. The business of
olive oil was thus closely tied to the growth of industrial machinery in
northern Europe, and southern reformers saw in it their best hope of catch-
ing up with the rest of the continent. A sociohistorical understanding of
eighteenth-century oil manufacture is therefore crucial to assessing south-
ern European industrialization and its relation to the economies of north-
ern Europe.
The early processes of mechanization in oil manufacture were highly
local and contingent in nature, far from incarnating some necessary stage
in the establishment of a modern factory system.2 The traditional design of
olive oil machinery (fig. 1) was a constitutive element of southern Euro-
pean societies. Modifying it meant modifying traditional landscapes and
ways of life as well. Reformers focused not only on machines, then, but also
on the sociocultural meanings associated with them; they sought to influ-
ence the intersection of Enlightenment culture, labor organization, and
technical design. And indeed, technical innovation succeeded only where
reformers succeeded in reshaping traditional ways of life as well as tradi-
tional machinery.3
The history of olive oil manufacturing technology lends support to a
relativistic view of technical artifacts—that is, to the idea that notions like
“effecting improvements,” “working better,” or even simply that a machine
can be said to “work” or “not work” are relative to specific conditions and
expectations, not deducible from intrinsic features of the machine itself.4
2. For similar considerations on preindustrial textile manufacture, see Charles Sabel
and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and
Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization,”Past and Present 108 (1986): 133–76.
3. Thomas Hughes’s conception of sociotechnical systems and the image of a network
elaborated by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law could certainly be used to
frame important aspects of the history of olive oil production; indeed, they have been a
powerful source of inspiration for this article. However, the argument presented here does
not rely on the theoretical assumptions usually associated with these ideas. See Thomas P.
Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930 (Baltimore,
1983); Michel Callon,“Society in the Making: The Study of Technology as a Tool for Soci-
ological Analysis,” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in
the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Tre-
vor J. Pinch (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 83–103; and Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How
to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1987).
4. On an argument that the answer to the question whether a machine “works”
depends on actors’ interpretations of the machine itself, see Donald MacKenzie, “How
Do We Know the Properties of Artefacts? Applying the Sociology of Knowledge to
Technology,” in Technological Change: Methods and Themes in the History of Technology,
ed. Robert Fox (Amsterdam, 1995), 247–63. On the roots of contemporary antideter-
minist trends in the historiography of technology, see Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, 1–6.
MAZZOTTIK|KMechanizing Olive Oil Production
279
The design of modern oil-manufacturing machinery resulted not from any
independent technological trajectory but from negotiations about who
should benefit from oil production, and how.5
5. The most relevant body of literature devoted to modern olive oil technology has
been produced by scholars working on the evolution of agricultural tools and techniques
in southern France, most notably Antoine Casanova; see his Paysans et machines à la fin
du XVIIIe siècle: Essai d’ethnologie historique (Paris, 1990), or, for a broader overview,
Marie-Claire Amouretti and Georges Comet, eds., L’évolution des techniques est-elle
autonome? (Aix-en-Provence, 1991). Drawing on the Marxian treatment of the relation
between machinery and labor processes, Casanova describes machines as elements of the
“productive forces,” which include artifacts, skills, training, and social relations. In this
sense, machines are always part of a “structured totality,” or milieu technique (Casanova,
317; the term derives from André Leroi-Gourhan, Milieu et techniques, 2 vols. [Paris,
1943–45]). This suggestive contextual analysis coexists with an essentially deterministic
model of technical change. Casanova concedes that the social structure can modify “the
rhythm of the evolution of the productive forces,” but contends that it does not shape
those forces in any deeper sense. What needs to be explained, he writes, are the “unequal
rhythms of development in different regions.” He refers to “obstacles” that delayed the
“progress of the productive forces” in oil manufacture, such as feudal rights concerning
milling; in that specific case, Casanova argues that feudal seigneurs preserved “bad
machinery,” neglecting its “technological shortcomings”; that their mills had “insuffi-
cient power”; that the oil extracted was “mediocre”; and that new machines had “better
technical features.” See Paysans et machines, 10, 12, and Antoine Casanova, Techniques,
société rurale et idéologie en France à la fin du XVIII siècle (Paris, 1978), 25, 32. Similar
arguments can be found in Charles Parain and Pierre Vilar, “Mode de production feodal
et classes sociales en système precapitaliste,” Les Cahiers du Centre d’E´tudes et de Recher-
ches Marxistes 59 (1968): 1–38. Working from this perspective, one can, to quote Donald
FIG. 1 Traditional oil making. (Johannes Stradanus [Jan van der Straet], Nova
Reperta [Antwerp, circa 1600].)
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The Business of Olive Oil
Oil production and trade spanned the centuries since the beginning of
Mediterranean civilization. The oil mills and presses of 1750 resembled
some of the machines used in antiquity. That is not to say that technology
had stagnated.6 Archaeological and ethnographic research has documented
the continuously changing forms of oil-production machinery.7 And al-
ways, changes in the socioeconomic setting of the oil-producing regions—
such as a shift to large-scale production for export—shaped technological
developments.8
This basic process of intertwined social, economic, and technological
change is in no way unidirectional. In the late Roman empire, for instance,
with trade declining on the Mediterranean routes, provinces once re-
nowned for their exports began to rely more on local consumption, and
producers in those areas turned from comparatively sophisticated technol-
ogy back to simpler alternatives. Northern Syria provides a good example.9
As trade declined in the fourth and fifth centuries C.E. and the population
grew, property parcels shrank and the vast estates devoted to oil production
for export were dismantled. Oil producers gradually abandoned the molae
oleariae—elaborate oil mills typically associated with the latifundia, slavery,
and the trading economy—in favor of smaller and cheaper mills. The fam-
ilies who ran the new mills had little money to invest in machinery con-
struction and maintenance, nor could they afford to buy timber, which
Syria lacked. They aimed to produce oil exclusively for local consumption.
MacKenzie, consistently “accept that the pace of technical change was affected by social
relations . . . while denying that those relations affected the actual design of technical
artifacts”; see “Marx and the Machine,” in Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change
(Cambridge, 1998), 44. On the theoretical relevance to the Marxian perspective of the
evolution of mills, see Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 2 (London,
1990), chapter 15, and Casanova, Paysans et machines, 7–10. See also Marc Bloch,
“Avènement et conquête du Moulin à eau,” Annales d’histoire économique et sociale 8
(1935): 538–635; Bertrand Gille, “Le Moulin à eau, une révolution technique médiévale,”
Techniques et civilisations 3 (1954); and Charles Parain, Outils, ethnies, et développement
historique (Paris, 1979), 305–29. For a similarly deterministic treatment of an eigh-
teenth-century productive technology, in which technological progress is said to be
inhibited or favored by certain political and economic conditions, see Brian Peckham,
“Technological Change in the British and French Starch Industries, 1750–1850,” Tech-
nology and Culture 27 (1986): 18–39.
6. Yves Pehaut, Les oléagineux dans le monde (Paris, 1986), 121.
7. Marie-Claire Amouretti, “Blocage des techniques antiques ou blocage des histo-
riens sur ces techniques?” E´tudes Corses 46–47 (1996): 235–51.
8. The pioneering study is Aage G. Drachmann, Ancient Oil Mills and Presses
(Copenhagen, 1932). See also Jean-Pierre Brun, L’oléiculture antique en Provence: Les hui-
leries du département du Var (Paris, 1986); Marie-Claire Amouretti, Oil and Wine
Production in the Mediterranean Area (Paris, 1993); and Rafael Frankel, Wine and Oil
Production in Antiquity in Israel and Other Mediterranean Countries (Sheffield, 1999).
9. Olivier Callot, Huileries antiques de Syrie du nord (Paris, 1984); see also Georges 
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The result was the success and diffusion of a rudimentary new milling-
pressing system that involved simply rolling a cylindrical stone over the
olives.10
The modern golden age of olive oil began around 1750. Increasing con-
sumption of oil for cooking and eating was only one factor accounting for
growing demand and rising prices; industrial uses, which included lighting,
lubrication, and the manufacture of soap and wool, also played an impor-
tant part.11 Responses to this increasing demand varied significantly
throughout Mediterranean Europe.
One can divide the oil-producing regions of Europe into three main
sociotechnical landscapes. The rural areas of Corsica, Portugal, and parts of
southern Italy were characterized by self-sufficient local economies and
communal systems of land ownership, and in these areas infrastructure and
machinery were shared and jointly owned. In the feudal lands of rural
Provence and southern Italy, royal, feudal, and communal rights over land
and machinery tended to concentrate in the hands of a few individuals or
institutions, and their competing claims often came into conflict. Finally, in
the bourgeoisie-controlled trading centers of the French and Italian Rivi-
eras, such as Aix, Marseilles, Nice, Genoa, and Lucca, ownership of land and
machines granted individuals control over the entire manufacturing
process. It was in this last setting that the opportunity offered by the grow-
ing demand for olive oil found well-organized elites ready to profit from it.
Mid-eighteenth-century French and Italian landowners invested consis-
tently in the cultivation of olive trees and the production of oil.12 The era also
saw the publication in France, Italy, and Portugal of a number of books and
shorter works on modern oil manufacture.13 These portrayed existing prac-
Tate, Les campagnes de la Syrie du Nord du Ie au VIIe siècle: Un exemple d’expansion démo-
graphique et économique dans les campagnes à la fin de l’antiquite, vol. 1 (Paris, 1992).
10. Callot, 20–23. For another case of technological reversion, see Noel Perrin,
Giving Up the Gun: Japan’s Reversion to the Sword, 1543–1879 (Boston, 1979). See also
Donald MacKenzie, “Theories of Technology and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons,” in
The Social Shaping of Technology, ed. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (Buck-
ingham, 1999), 419–42.
11. In the 1790s a combination of war and bad crops precipitated a crisis in the olive
oil industry, which became structural with the appearance of cheaper mineral oils. For a
socioeconomic analysis of the oil crisis in southern Italy, see Aurelio Lepre, “Una crisi
olearia verso la fine del Settecento,” in Aurelio Lepre, Contadini, borghesi ed operai nel tra-
monto del feudalesimo napoletano (Milan, 1963), 243–68.
12. In the coastal areas of Calabria, for instance, landlords systematically replaced
mulberry trees and other arboreal cultures with olive trees. See Augusto Placanica, Storia
dell’olio d’oliva in Calabria dall’antichità ai giorni nostri (Corigliano Calabro, 1999),
115–17.
13. Lazare Sieuve, Mémoire et journal d’observations et d’expériences sur les moyens de
garantir les olives de la piqure des insectes: Nouvelle méthode pour en extraire une huile plus
abondante et plus fine, par l’invention d’un Moulin domestique, avec la manière de la
garantir de toute rancissure (Paris, 1769); Domenico Grimaldi, Istruzioni sulla nuova
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tices and machines as products of scientific ignorance, barbarian customs,
and medieval law—truly a heritage of the dark ages. In 1782 the Académie
des Sciences, Lettres et Arts of Marseilles offered a prize for a treatise on the
cultivation of olive trees “and the best way to extract oil from olives” that gen-
erated an unprecedented number of responses.14 The Accademia dei Geor-
gofili in Florence, the agricultural society of Aix, and the royal academies of
science of Naples and Lisbon also began to support similar research.15
These developments occurred in the context of a more general reform
movement in agriculture and manufacturing. Reformers saw this effort as
a process of rationalization that derived directly from the scientific tradi-
tion of the Encyclopédie, and as their patriotic contribution to their coun-
tries’ economic well-being.16 They identified as basic conditions for pro-
manifattura dell’olio introdotta nel Regno di Napoli (Naples, 1777); François Rozier, “Vues
économiques sur les moulins et pressoirs a l’huile d’olives, connus en France ou en
Italie,” Observations sur la physique, sur l’histoire naturelle et sur les arts 8 (1776): 417–43;
François Rozier, Cours complet d’agriculture, théorique, pratique, économique, et de
médicine rurale et vétérinaire, 10 vols. (Paris, 1783–1800), s.v. “huile” and “olivier”; Pierre
Joseph Amoreux, Traité de l’olivier (Montpellier, 1784; reprint, Nîmes, 1990), and
Mémoire sur la nécessité et les moyens d’améliorer l’agriculture dans le district de Mont-
pellier (Montpellier, [1795]); Joaõ Antonio Dalla Bella, Memórias e observações sôbre o
modo de aperfeiçoar a manefactura [sic] do azeite de oliveira em Portugal (Lisbon, 1784);
Abbé Couture, Traité de l’olivier (Aix, 1786; reprint, Nîmes, 1996); Pons-Joseph Bernard,
Mémoire pour servir à l’histoire naturelle de l’olivier (Marseille, 1788; reprinted in part in
Casanova, Techniques [n. 5 above], 59–166); Cosimo Moschettini, Osservazioni intorno
agli ostacoli de’ trappeti feudali alla prosperità della olearia economia (Naples, 1792);
Bartolomeo Gandolfi, Saggio teorico-pratico sopra gli ulivi, l’olio e i saponi (Rome, 1793);
Giovanni Presta, Trattato degli ulivi, delle ulive, e della maniera di cavar l’olio, o si riguardi
di primo scopo la massima perfezione, o si riguardi la massima possibile quantità del medes-
imo (1794), in Giovanni Presta, Opere, vol. 2 (Lecce, 1988). A few technical novelties
appeared in eighteenth-century Spain, such as the rulas, a pair of millstones shaped like
conic trunks, but no traces exist of any significant campaign for the mechanization of oil
manufacture there. See Agricultores, botánicos y manufactureros en el siglo XVIII: Los
sueños de la Ilustración española (Madrid, 1989), 146–49.
14. In 1766 the Société Royale des Sciences of Montpellier had asked for treatises on
the best way of making and preserving olive oil, but the response had not been particu-
larly remarkable. See Mémoire sur la culture de l’olivier et la manière d’extraire l’huile des
olives: Pour servir de réponse à la question proposée par l’Académie des Belle-Lettres,
Sciences et Arts de Marseille, pour le sujet du Prix de 1782 (Aix, 1783), 43.
15. Marie-Claire Amouretti, “Des agronomes latins aux agronomes provençaux: Les
moulins à huile,” Provence historique 31 (1981): 83–100.
16. See, for instance, Presta, 10. Giovanni Presta (1720–97), from Gallipoli, in
Apulia, was a renowned physician and agronomist and an enlightened landowner. Gio-
vanni Targioni Tozzetti (1712–83) also typifies these practical-minded Enlightenment
reformers. A physician and a member of the Accademia dei Georgofili of Florence, Toz-
zetti explicitly sought to establish a “philosophical theory” of agriculture and manufac-
ture to end the reliance on “popular practices.” What he wanted was “a new method to
study agriculture” based on mathematics, physics, and natural history. See Giovanni Tar-
gioni Tozzetti, Ragionamenti sull’agricoltura toscana (Lucca, 1759), vi–vii, 1–27.
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gress first the recognition of full, exclusive rights of ownership over land,
and second, the rationalization of production—meaning mechanization,
standardized procedures, and work discipline. Thus, the Enlightenment
emerged in the Mediterranean lands first of all as an urge for technical
innovation. But one should not lose sight of the political and social con-
cerns that informed the material and literary productions of the southern
Enlightenment. The alleged neutrality of these pragmatic concerns (prices,
taxes, grain trade, oil mills) should be understood in relation to the pre-
vailing cultural conditions. In many southern European societies, reform-
ers had only a very limited capacity to mobilize resources in support of
modernization. The strategic use of technical discourse could, in such cir-
cumstances, undermine the foundations of the sociopolitical system with-
out directly attacking traditions. Their awareness of their weak social posi-
tion explains why southern entrepreneurs repeatedly sought government
help, either in the form of credit or in the form of institutions to foster pro-
duction and technical education, even as they defended laissez-faire princi-
ples. What they were asking for was state-controlled economic liberaliza-
tion, guided by the tenets of the new enlightened rationalism.
Whether they were active in provincial economic societies, managing
their own farms, or writing pamphlets in a capital city like Naples or Lisbon,
reformer-entrepreneurs shared a way of thinking and a set of basic beliefs.17
In particular, they believed in the power of analysis. This term had a very
broad meaning in the eighteenth century: it indicated a savoir faire, a way of
representing reality and intervening in it. Analytic rationality included dif-
ferent but related kinds of cultural resources, skills, and procedures, among
them problem-solving techniques based on the resolution-composition of
ideas, the mechanization of thinking according to combinatorial rules of
algebra, and the study of economic issues on the basis of individual and col-
lective utility. It provided a unitary and universally valid framework in
which subjects ranging from mathematics to human biology, the structure
of society, or the distribution of labor in a mill could be understood. Mathe-
maticians had shown that solving a differential equation required breaking
it down to its component terms and then solving each one independently,
according to formal rules. In similar fashion, reformers began searching for
the elementary units and basic operations of their own fields.18
17. The boundaries between the categories entrepreneur, agronomist, and reformer
were extremely blurred. The enlightened scientist-entrepreneur was indeed a typical fig-
ure in eighteenth-century agricultural reform. See, for instance, Jerry B. Gough, “Wine-
craft and Chemistry in 18th-Century France: Chaptal and the Invention of Chaptaliza-
tion,” History of Technology 39 (1998): 74–104. On the French provincial academies, see
Daniel Roche, Le siècle des lumières en province: Académies et académiciens provinciaux,
1680–1789, 2 vols. (Paris, 1978).
18. On the politics of eighteenth-century mathematical analysis, see Eric Brian, La
mesure de l’état: Administrateurs et géomètres au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1994), and Massimo 
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Who were these reformers? They varied in social and cultural back-
ground. Some were proprietors of great estates who, following the example
of the English landed aristocracy, aimed to modify land use customs.
Others were bourgeois entrepreneurs willing to risk their wealth in a new
kind of speculation. Others were civil servants, enlightened bureaucrats
interested in the experimental sciences, and members of scientific acade-
mies. Let us consider three representatives, taken from Italy, France and
Portugal.
In Italy much of the literature on olive oil production came from the
Kingdom of Naples, where it was by far the single most important export.
Oil was the main source of revenue in the provinces of Apulia and Calabria,
in parts of which the cultivation of olive groves amounted to monoculture.
Unlike certain Provençal and northern Italian oils, the southern product
was not considered to be of high-quality (olio fino). In the 1760s a desire to
enter the profitable market for olio fino pushed reformers in Apulia and
Calabria to study oil production and support modernization. The Marquis
Domenico Grimaldi (1735–1805), a member of an old Genoese patrician
family, led their campaign. The interests of the Grimaldis were divided
between two very different worlds: the trading centers of the French and
Italian Rivieras on the one hand, and the feudal-communal lands of Calab-
ria on the other. Because of their international connections and trading
skills, the Grimaldis were in a better position to perceive and react to favor-
able economic conditions than the Calabrian aristocracy. In the 1760s the
reform movement in Naples was strong, the cultural atmosphere favored
change, prices were rising, and good-quality oil offered higher profits than
any other type of agricultural venture in Calabria. The Grimaldis decided
to invest heavily in the modernization of oil manufacture.19 By 1765
Domenico was administering a family estate near Genoa and traveling
through Provence, Switzerland, and Northern Italy to study agricultural
techniques, tools, and machines. A few years later he was back in Calabria,
Mazzotti, “The Geometers of God: Mathematics and Reaction in the Kingdom of
Naples,” Isis 89 (1998): 674–701. On analytic rationality in engineering and manufacture,
see Antoine Picon, L’invention de l’ingénieur moderne: L’Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées,
1747–1851 (Paris, 1992); Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment
in France, 1763–1815 (Princeton, N.J., 1997); and Massimo Mazzotti, “Le savoir de l’in-
génieur: Mathématique et politique à Naples sous le Bourbon,” Actes de la recherche en
sciences sociales 141/142 (2002): 86–97.
19. On Neapolitan reformism, see Franco Venturi, “La Napoli di Antonio Genovesi,”
in Settecento riformatore (Turin, 1998), 1:523–644, and Giuseppe Galasso, La filosofia in
soccorso de’ governi: La cultura napoletana del Settecento (Naples, 1989). For a selection of
writings by Neapolitan reformers, see Franco Venturi, ed., Illuministi italiani, vol. 5,
Riformatori napoletani (Milan, 1962), which includes a biographical essay on Grimaldi
(411–30). On Grimaldi, see also Antonio Basile, “Un illuminista calabrese: Domenico
Grimaldi da Seminara,” Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania 13 (1943): 16–156, and
Domenico Luciano, ed., Domenico Grimaldi e la Calabria nel ‘700 (Assisi, 1974), xi–lvii.
20. Domenico Grimaldi, Saggio di economia campestre per la Calabria Ultra (Naples,
1770; reprinted in Luciano, 1–175). Grimaldi was a corresponding member of the
Société Royale d’Agriculture of Paris and of the O¨konomische Gesellschaft of Berne, to
which he sent an essay on the cultivation of a new kind of grass for artificial fields; Ven-
turi, Riformatori napoletani, 414.
21. Grimaldi, Istruzioni sulla nuova manifattura dell’olio (n. 13 above). See also
Domenico Grimaldi, Memoria per lo ristabilimento dell’industria olearia e della agri-
coltura nelle Calabrie ed altre provincie del Regno di Napoli (Naples, 1783), and Memoria
sulla economia olearia antica e moderna e sull’antico frantojo da olio trovato negli scava-
menti di Stabia (Naples, 1783).
22. André Bourde, Agronomie et agronomes en France au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1967),
1561–608. See also Jean Boulaine, “Vingt ans de vulgarisation trop exclusive, 1785–
1805,” in Marie-Claire Amouretti and François Sigault, Traditions agronomiques europé-
ennes: E´laborations et transmission depuis l’antiquité (Paris, 1998), 53–63.
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promoting such innovations as the cultivation of citrus fruits, a new plow
design, a new type of irrigation system, and a new silk-throwing process.20
Meanwhile he turned out a series of essays on the modern manufacture of
olive oil (which he called “Genoese manufacture”), addressing them to
southern landowners, investors, and politicians.21
In France, technical change was also championed by scientifically
minded agronomists to whom oil manufacture was but one aspect of the
general problem of the modernization of agriculture. They included gentil-
shommes agronomes as well as men of more humble origin employed at
some level of public administration.22 The Journal de l’agriculture, du com-
merce et des finances (Paris, 1765–83), François Rozier’s Cours complet d’a-
griculture and his Journal de Physique (Paris, 1773–93), and Despommiers’s
L’art de s’enrichir promptement par l’agriculture prouvé par des experiences
(Paris, 1762), were among the key publications of the movement for agri-
cultural reform. Pons-Joseph Bernard’s Mémoire pour servir à l’histoire
naturelle de l’olivier (1788) was another. Born near Draguignan, in Pro-
vence, Bernard (1748–1816) joined the Oratorian order in 1764. Nine years
later he left the path to the priesthood and decided to devote himself to sci-
entific studies and a career in public administration. He first became direc-
tor of the royal navy observatory in Marseilles. In 1780 he was employed by
the regional government of Provence to oversee engineering problems
related to the modification of the course of the river Durance. In 1790 he
was named administrator of the department of Var and a member of the
Directoire. He became chief engineer for Var, and a corresponding member
of the Académie Royale des Sciences in Paris. Along with his scientific
papers in mathematics, astronomy, and hydraulics, Bernard published
works on natural history and agronomy, and his Mémoire pour servir à
l’histoire naturelle de l’olivier provided a detailed description of modern oil
manufacture. His arguments therein, he wrote, were built on the “immense
progress of mechanics and physics.” He dismissed earlier authors as lacking
either empirical knowledge of the natural features of Provence, or experi-
23. On the scientific and cultural role of the estrangeirados, see Ana Simões, Ana Car-
neiro, and Maria Paula Diogo, “Constructing Knowledge: Eighteenth-Century Portugal
and the New Sciences,” in The Sciences in the European Periphery during the Enlighten-
ment, ed. Kostas Gavroglu (Dordrecht, 1999), 1–40.
24. On Dalla Bella’s scientific activity, see Dizionario biografico degli italiani, s.v.
“Dalla Bella, Giovanni.” On experimental physics in Portugal, see Rómulo de Carvalho,
“A Física na Reforma Pombalina,” in Actividades Científicas em Portugal no Século XVIII
(Evora, 1996), 605–30.
25. Esteves Pereira, “Economia em Portugal no século XVIII: Aspectos de mentali-
dade,” Prelo 2 (1984): 25–40; José Luís Cardoso, O pensamento económico em Portugal nos
finais do século XVIII, 1780–1808 (Lisbon, 1989), 35–123; Jacinto Nunes, “A contribução
das Memórias Económicas para o desenvolvimento científico e económico do país,” in
História e desenvolvimento da ciência em Portugal (Lisbon, 1992), 2:1341–51. On the
specific features of the Portuguese agricultural system, see Albert Silbert, Le Portugal
Méditerranéen à la fin de l’ancien régime, XVIIIe–début du XIXe siècle: Contribution a
l’histoire agraire comparée (Paris, 1966).
26. José Luís Cardoso, ed., Memórias económicas da Academia Real das Ciências de
Lisboa, para o adiantamento da agricoltura, des artes e da indústria em Portugal, e suas
conquistas, 1789–1815 (Lisbon, 1990). For biographical information on the academics,
see Moses B. Amzalak, A economia política em Portugal: O fisiocràtismo—as Memórias
Económicas da Academia e os seus colaboradores (Lisbon, 1922).
27. Dalla Bella, Memórias e observações (n. 13 above), and Memória sôbre a cultura
das oliveiras em Portugal (Coimbra, 1786).
28. “If what we do is not useful, [our] glory is foolish.” The same incipit opened the
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mental skills, or modern scientific knowledge, which included both “la
physique de l’olivier” and “la physique des machines.”
In Portugal, reform was supported by a group of intellectuals very close
to the government, the so-called estrangeirados. The term referred both to
foreign scholars and to Portuguese who had spent part of their professional
careers abroad. The reform government of the Marquis of Pombal charged
the estrangeirados with modernizing the teaching of science and applying
modern scientific knowledge to the solution of Portugal’s economic prob-
lems.23 The main Portuguese work on modern oil manufacture was written
by Giovanni Antonio Dalla Bella (1730–1823), an Italian lecturer on exper-
imental physics from the University of Padua who joined the Collegio Real
dos Nobres of Lisbon in 1767. In 1772, in the context of Pombal’s univer-
sity reform, Dalla Bella moved his cabinet of experimental physics to the
new royal university in Coimbra.24 A few years later he also became a mem-
ber of the Academia Real das Sciencias of Lisbon, founded with the explicit
purpose of using modern scientific knowledge to stimulate the economic
growth of the country.25 Most representative of the activity of this academy
were the contributions collected in the Memórias económicas, published
from 1789 on.26 Among Dalla Bella’s own agronomic publications were
essays on the manufacture of olive oil and the culture of olive trees.27 Nisi
utile est quod facimus, stulta est gloria was the epigraph for the Memórias
económicas in 1789. Three years later the Apulian reformer Cosimo Mos-
chettini would open his essay against feudal rights to oil manufacture with
exactly the same words.28
Memórias da Academia Real das Sciencias [sic] de Lisboa, vol. 1, Desde 1780 até 1788 (Lis-
bon, 1797).
29. The trapetum was a Roman oil mill, of a very different design. See G. Arrighi,
“Notizia di un frantoio pompeiano per olive,” Klearchos 19 (1963): 83–86.
30. Carlo Afan de Rivera, Tavole di riduzione dei pesi e delle misure delle Due Sicilie in
quelli statuiti dalla legge del 6 aprile 1840 (Naples, 1840).
31. A wealth of folklore surrounded Apulian underground mills and the oil-making
process. The sciacuddri, a spiteful gnome who inhabits a mill, is a common figure in the
folklore of most oil-producing regions. See Antonio Monte, Frantoi ipogei del Salento
(Lecce, 1995), 36–37. On the operation of underground, or hypogeal, mills, see also Lucia
Milizia Fasano, Il trappeto sotterraneo in Terra d’Otranto (Lecce, 1991).
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Traditional Oil Manufacture
The production of olive oil involved a few basic steps: olives were col-
lected, stored, milled, and pressed, with the oil then left to clear in special
containers. Traditional animal- or water-powered oil mills used a vertical
millstone that turned on a metal pivot around a vertical axle and rolled
upon another circular stone (the dormant stone), horizontally placed,
crushing the fruit by simple pressure (although certain Roman mills
ground the fruit). Mill buildings and materials varied from region to
region, as did the design of the various parts of the mechanism.
In Calabria, olives were crushed in the trappeto.29 This machine was
located in a large building, also called a trappeto, where the olives were
stored in great baskets (cestoni) or wooden cupboards (zimboni). The typi-
cal Calabrian trappeto used a vertical millstone approximately 5 Neapolitan
palmi in diameter and measuring 1.5 palmi on its edge (1 palmo equals
0.253 meters).30 The dormant stone was often concave, like a basin, so that
the millstone made only partial contact with it. A mule supplied power,
while a man fed the olives into the stone with a spade. In Apulia, millstones
were bigger (6 to 8 Neapolitan palmi in diameter), heavier, and rolled on a
flat dormant stone. The edge of the millstone was rounded, reducing the
contact surface by two-thirds and increasing the force applied at the point
of contact. A circular basin surrounded the dormant stone, and a man
moved the olives from the basin back under the stone repeatedly until they
were ready for pressing. The Apulian oil mill was carved into the rock, a few
meters underground.31 This type of mill was widespread in southern Apu-
lia because of its relatively inexpensive construction and the insulating
properties of stone (warmth being a crucial factor in oil production). Rivers
are rare in Apulia, so mills there were animal-powered. By comparison, tra-
ditional Provençal mills use smaller millstones and were powered either by
a horse (moulin à sang) or by a waterwheel (moulin à eau). Mills of the lat-
ter type used a horizontal wheel placed under the dormant stone and turn-
ing around the same axle as the millstone.
Pressing offered a wider spectrum of technical possibilities. Four basic
types of oil presses were in use around 1750, each with endless local varia-
32. Charles Parain, “Typologie des pressoirs pré-industriels et aires de diffusion des
types successifs en Europe occidentale,” in VI Congrès International des Sciences Anthro-
pologiques et Ethnologiques (Paris, 1960).
33. Casanova, Paysans et machines (n. 5 above), described the use of this archaic
press in eighteenth-century Corsica. On similar presses in southern Italy, see Presta (n.
13 above), 401–5.
34. Louis Liger, La nouvelle maison rustique ou économie générale de tous les biens de
campagne (Paris, 1749).
35. Dalla Bella, Memórias e observações (n. 13 above), 50–51.
36. This was the case for the mills of Idanha a Velha and Enxabarda, in the district
of Castelo Branco. See Marie-Claire Amouretti et al., “A` propos du pressoir à huile: De
l’archéologie industrielle à l’histoire,” Mélanges de l’E´cole Française de Rome—Antiquité
96 (1984): 379–421.
37. A lever-and-screw press (prensa de viga y quintal) from the oil-producing region 
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tions.32 Torsion presses were common in Corsica and southern Italy.33 In
this type of press, very ripe olives were put in a large sack made of goat hair,
which was then pushed into place in a wooden trough. Two people then
twisted the sack using a pair of sticks, forcing oil from the olives, which col-
lected in the trough and drained into a receptacle. Each sack of olives would
be pressed in this way several times, with hot water being used at the end to
help extract the last remnants of oil from the fruit.
The beam press (presse à arbre) was common in southern France. In its
basic form this consisted of a long wooden lever, one end pinned in a recess
in a wall or between two pillars, while the other could be pulled down to
exert pressure on whatever was under the lever, or beam—in this case, a bag
of olive paste. The sacks used with this type of press were made of vegetable
fiber to allow the oil to pass through them. In the most archaic examples,
the lever was forced downward by a great stone (350–400 kilograms). Beam
presses were in use in the Aegean world before 1000 B.C.E. and could be
found in Corsica as late as the nineteenth century. A more complex varia-
tion included the use of a capstan, which lifted a counterweight. The lever
could also be forced down with the aid of screws. In the first edition of the
Encyclopédie, Diderot praised a counterbalanced lever-and-screw press
common in Provence and Languedoc, called the pressoir à gran banc or
“Greek press,” and recommended its use in the manufacture of olive oil.
Another variation was the pressoir à taissons, depicted in Louis Liger’s
Maison rustique (1749), in which the screw was fixed to the ground.34
Screws, capstans, and bascule levers could be employed to increase the
amount of force exerted by the press without increasing the amount of
force required to operate it. Indeed, the limited need for power and the con-
tinuous action of the lever were well-known advantages of these presses.
Dalla Bella describes a lever-and-screw press from the region of Coimbra,
Portugal, in which the free end of the lever was forced down by means of a
wooden screw fixed to a stone.35 Some of these Portuguese lever-and-screw
presses continued to operate into the twentieth century.36 A very similar
type of press was common in Andalucia, Spain.37
of Jaen has been recently reconstructed and described in some detail. José Ignacio Rojas
Sola, Estudio histórico-tecnológico de molinos y prensas para la fabricación de aceite de
oliva: Aplicación al estudio en detalle y reconstruction gráfica de una prensa de viga y quin-
tal (Jaén, 1997).
38. See Rozier, “Vues économiques sur les moulins” (n. 13 above), 426–28, on the
technical properties of the pressoir à martin.
39. In Apulia, for instance, oil mills were typically built in or near the feudal manor:
the Marquis Granafei had fourteen oil mills on his estate at Sternatia, while the lord of
Melpignano had seven oil mills in the subterranean mill of his castle. See Monte (n. 31
above), 47.
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The other most common kind of press, the screw press, worked by
means of the direct action of one or two screws. Like the lever press, the
main variations of the screw press can be traced back to classical sources,
which described its use in wine making and oil production. The double-
screw press, in which a wooden beam is forced downward by two fixed
screws, was found all over southern Italy, along the Adriatic coasts, and on
some Greek islands. It was often referred to as “Calabrian press.” Central
screw presses were relatively common in northern Italy and Provence. They
could vary greatly in size, force exerted, and structure. One problem with
this type of machine was that the upper beam and the two lateral pillars
broke down rather easily. Mid-eighteenth century agronomists agreed that
a sophisticated bascule lever-and-screw press was on the whole superior to
the central screw press.38
Reformers portrayed this technological congeries as chaotic and irra-
tional, and argued that new machines could extract oil in the most rational
and effective way. Grimaldi offers a representative example. He described
three basic advantages to modern oil-manufacturing technology: it was
cheaper, meaning more mills distributed more rationally in the landscape;
it produced more oil from of the same amount of olives in less time; and it
produced better oil. Like Bernard and Dalla Bella a few years later, Grimaldi
presented the adoption of new technology as a simple and straightforward
matter, the natural outcome of the application of modern science to agri-
culture and manufacturing.
In the traditional Mediterranean landscape oil mills were among the
most conspicuous signs of feudal power.39 They required considerable
investment to build and operate, and returned a profit only if numerous
small and medium-sized producers brought their olives for processing (in
Apulia, the common phrase was the “mill’s dowry”). This meant enforcing
the feudal jus prohibendi, or right of excluding others, either by the lord or
by communal authorities. In 1792 the Apulian reformer Cosimo Moschet-
tini published an essay arguing that the jus prohibendi impeded the diffu-
sion of modern manufacturing, because entrepreneurs could not build their
own mills, while feudal lords had no interest in making their mills more
efficient. Bernard wrote about the same problem, which in Provence took
the form of a monopoly over oil milling conferred on a seigneur by the right
40. Moschettini (n. 13 above). Mireille Bourgey, “Un cas de réaction féodale: La
banalité du moulin à huile de La Fare,” Provence historique 12 (1962): 309–33. See also
Michel Derlange, “Olivier, huile et gestion communale en Provence orientale sous l’An-
cien Régime,” Provence historique 31 (1981): 113–25.
41. On the development of the southern Italian bourgeoisie, and on their investing
strategies, see Lepre (n. 11 above); Patrick Chorley, Oil, Silk, and Enlightenment: Eco-
nomic Problems in XVIIIth Century Naples (Naples, 1965); and John Davies, Merchants,
Monopolists, and Contractors: A Study of Economic Activity and Society in Bourbon Naples,
1815–1860 (New York, 1981).
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of banalité, which obliged inhabitants of the seigneury to use the mill.
During the second half of the eighteenth century this monopoly became the
subject of heated disputes. The community of La Fare, for example, which
had conceded this right to the local seigneur in 1709, went through a long-
drawn-out trial (1758–66) to regain it. Technical questions about oil-manu-
facturing machinery played a crucial role in the legal battle, as it emerged
that the farmers who brought their olives to the mill had come to regard the
traditional manufacturing process as gravely inadequate.40
The first advantage that reformers attributed to modernized oil manu-
facture, then, namely the diffusion of privately owned mills, conflicted with
the interests of the great absentee landowners. These interests did not neatly
coincide with those of the landed aristocracy. While historians have correctly
emphasized the differences between feudatories and bourgeois entrepre-
neurs, the distinctions between these categories sometimes blurred. In
Southern Italy, for example, the bourgeoisie could grow in the shadow of the
feudal system without attacking it as a whole, profiting instead from the
opportunities it offered for attractive low-risk investment. Entrepreneurs
often found it profitable to invest in—and so to reinforce—an absentee
mode of production, mainly by selling credit to impoverished tenant farm-
ers and speculating in cereals and oil.41
New Proprietors, New Machines, New Oil
Why was it that in the mid-eighteenth century feudal mills and tradi-
tional oil production came under criticism as inefficient? To answer this
question we need to scrutinize descriptions of the machines involved and
of the quality of the final product. This means shifting our analysis to the
level of design.
Grimaldi carefully recorded his investigations into oil production.
These invariably confirmed the technical superiority of modern technol-
ogy, which he attributed to the fact that modern machinery was more pow-
erful. Like Bernard, Grimaldi criticized traditional millstones as too small,
too light, and badly cut. The olive paste produced by these stones contained
pieces that were too large, making oil extraction more difficult and less effi-
cient. To improve the crushing action, Grimaldi advocated first changing
42. The beginning of the mass production of olio fino in the Genoese Riviera can be
dated to the third decade of the eighteenth century. See Grimaldi, Istruzioni sulla nuova
manifattura dell’olio (n. 13 above), 106.
43. Oil lamps diffused rapidly throughout Europe in this period, particularly after
the introduction of the annular wick in 1782. On the extensive use of olive oil for lubri-
cating clocks, see Charles K. Aked, “Oil for Chronometers,” Antiquarian Horology 5
(1968): 454–55, and David S. Landes, Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the
Modern World (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 132–44, 171–76.
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the dimensions of the millstone. In place of the traditional ratio between
edge and diameter of around three to ten, he proposed a ratio of one to ten;
and rather than cut the stone so that it was approximately as thick at the
edge as at the center, he thought the stone should taper along its radius to
a narrower edge. These changes would entail others: to facilitate the crush-
ing action of the thin-edged stone the basin should be redesigned to resem-
ble a well opening, with vertical walls surrounding a flat dormant stone,
and the man who fed olives to the millstone could be replaced by a metal
device (called mescia by the Genoese) that pushed olives under the stone at
each revolution of the stone around the axle.
Would a new mill built along those lines indeed extract more oil from
the same amount of olives? New machines worked better only for those
who shared certain new assumptions, and in fact reformers did not want
merely to produce more oil. Prices could be increased and new markets cre-
ated only by changing the nature of the product and widening the range of
possible uses. Entrepreneurs wanted to invest in the manufacture of high-
quality oil (olio fino, huile vierge, azeite fino), which could be sold on inter-
national markets at up to double the price of common oil. At midcentury,
the centers of production of high-quality oil were Provence (Aix), the
Italian Riviera (Genoa, Oneglia), and Tuscany (Lucca). Among the charac-
teristics that distinguished their oils from those made in the rest of the
Mediterranean basin the most important was their low acidity. They were
also more transparent, sweeter, and, crucially, much easier to preserve.
Changes in external conditions affected common oil more readily, and it
began to turn rancid after a comparatively short period of time. And when
oil became rancid it lost not only its original flavor but also the other phys-
ical characteristics that made it valuable. At best it could be shipped to
Marseilles to be used for soap making. As international demand steadily
grew, the main concern for producers and traders became not the supply
but rather the quality of the product.42
High-quality oil not only lasted longer than common oil, which made
it more desirable for long-distance trade; it also burned more efficiently in
lamps and made a better lubricant for clockworks.43 Most of all, low-acid-
ity olive oil worked better than any other known material as a lubricant for
industrial machinery. It spread easily and thoroughly over surfaces, and it
did not congeal, taking up to seven days to gain as little as 1.7 percent of its
44. Leonard Archbutt and R. Mountford Deeley, Lubrication and Lubricants: A
Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Lubrication, and on the Nature, Properties, and
Testing of Lubricants (London, 1922), 56–92; Robert H. Thurston, A Treatise on Friction
and Lost Work in Machinery and Millwork (New York, 1903), 122, 282; P. S. Bardell,
“Some Aspects of the History of Journal Bearings and Their Lubrication,” History of
Technology 4 (1979): 1–30, 1–2.
45. On lighting, see, for example, Couture (n. 13 above), 2:178–81.
46. Presta seems to have been alone in admitting that the price of low-acidity oil
would effectively prohibit the popolo basso (lower classes) from consuming it; see Presta
(n. 13 above), 592. The reformers’ argument about the improved taste of low-acidity oil
was far from commonsensical. Vitangelo Bisceglia, in his report to the Neapolitan
Ministry of the Interior (1813) wrote, “the lower classes find [common oil] palatable,
and digest it without problems”; quoted in Vincenzo Ricchioni, “Un pioniere forestiero
del risorgimento agrario meridionale,” Rivista di storia economica 3 (1938): 211–40, 215.
Dalla Bella remarked on the pungent flavor of traditional Portuguese oil, which pleased
the vulgo but not the new “delicate tables”; Dalla Bella, Memórias e observações (n. 13
above), xi. The very notion of what olive oil should taste like seems to have changed in
the process of modernizing its manufacture. On the social shaping of taste and its use as
a mark of social distinction, see Pierre Bourdieu, La distinction: Critique sociale du juge-
ment (Paris, 1979), esp. 204–30.
47. Bartolomeo Ravenna, Memorie istoriche della Città di Gallipoli (Naples, 1836),
105–6. Gallipoli was renowned for its stone-built cisterns, in which oil was stored and left
to clear for months, even years. For a description of these cisterns in 1816, see John Mc-
Culloch, Dictionary of Commerce (London, 1882), 975.
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weight after exposure to the air. Because of its viscosity and oiliness, olive
oil worked extremely well under pressure: it maintained coefficients of fric-
tion between 0.07 and 0.08 between wood surfaces, metal surfaces, or a
combination of the two. This meant that, given the relatively low rotational
speed of English machinery before the turn of the nineteenth century, olive
oil could endure great stress without decomposing.44
Reformers did not refer directly to the industrial uses of olive oil.
Rather, they framed the modernization of oil production as a project of
national economic reform, stressing the local uses of high-quality oil in
lighting, cooking, and medicine.45 They placed great emphasis on the supe-
rior taste of low-acidity oil, and on its beneficial health effects. But the high
price of low-acidity oil betrays the deception at the core of these tracts. In
reality, modernized production would force local peasants to consume
cheaper by-products instead of the oil to which they were accustomed.
Meanwhile, a taste for low-acidity olive oil became a mark of the affluent
Mediterranean bourgeoisie.46
The new marketing strategies of olive oil producers and traders must
have been evident to anyone visiting a major Mediterranean oil port.
Gallipoli, in Apulia, offers a revealing example. By the 1780s most Apulian
oil was shipped abroad through this small coastal town. On a clear day its
harbor might easily contain seventy foreign vessels waiting for a load of liq-
uid gold.47 A Swiss traveler visiting Gallipoli in 1789 noted that low-acidity
oil was sold to the English and the Dutch, while common oil went mostly
48. Ulysses von Salis-Marschlins, Viaggio nel Regno di Napoli (1790; reprint, Lecce,
1979), 162.
49. M. A. Visceglia, Territorio, feudo e potere locale: Terra d’Otranto tra mediovevo ed
età moderna (Naples, 1988), 158. On the British vice-consulate at Gallipoli, see also
Nicolette James, Inglesi a Gallipoli: Sofia Stevens (1845–1876)—An English Family in
Gallipoli (Lecce, 1993), 109–26. Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands also had
representatives there. In 1740 the king of Naples established a consolato del mare (mar-
itime consulate) in the city.
50. On translators, see James, 123–24. The quote is from Biagio Salvemini, “The
Arrogance of the Market: The Economy of the Kingdom between the Mediterranean and
Europe,” in Naples in the Eighteenth Century: The Birth and Death of a Nation State, ed.
Girolamo Imbruglia (Cambridge, 2000), 56.
51. C. Massa, Il prezzo e il commercio degli olio d’oliva di Gallipoli e di Bari (Bari,
1897), 37.
52. In 1785 the quantity of Levantine oil landed at Trieste amounted to fifteen per-
cent of that from Apulia. In 1793 a Venetian consul in Trieste reported that Apulian oil
could last up to four years without becoming rancid, as compared to one year for
Levantine oil. See Ruggiero Romano, “Il Regno di Napoli e la vita commerciale nell’Adri-
atico,” in Napoli: Dal viceregno al regno—Storia economica (Turin, 1976), 138–39.
53. Entire chapters of the reformers’ treatises were devoted to the issue of when an
olive can be properly said to be ripe. The modern view was that olives should be pressed
at the stage when they changed color from green to red; fully black olives were already
too ripe to produce low-acidity oil. But the reformers differed among themselves as to
this, with the French insisting on harvesting at earlier stages than the Italians. They did
agree, however, on the essential point that harvesting traditionally took place far too late
in the year, and also that the use of windfalls was deleterious to quality.
54. Dalla Bella, Memórias e observações (n. 13 above), 18–21. On employing children
and women in oil manufacture, see also Presta (n. 13 above), 389–90, and Grimaldi,
Istruzioni sulla nuova manifattura dell’olio (n. 13 above), 44, who noticed that in 
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toward Marseilles.48 A British vice-consul resided there permanently to fos-
ter trade with England, which, by the end of the century, had become a
leading oil importer.49 Professional interpreters found plentiful work trans-
lating documents in what had become “a sort of English colony.”50 From
1782 on the price of oil from Gallipoli was published regularly in London,
which gives a sense of the significance of this trade.51 In the same period
Apulian oil was winning the competition against Levantine and Berber oils
in the Trieste market, the port that served Austria and south Germany. In
Trieste as elsewhere, low acidity and durability were the most desirable
qualities.52
With these developments in view it becomes clearer that modernized
methods of making olive oil did not evolve in some sort of natural devel-
opment but were rather the consequence of the new meaning attached to
oil production by reformer-entrepreneurs. In order to produce low-acidity
oil, olives must be processed earlier in the season, when they are less ripe.53
An early harvest meant paying more for labor, as underripe olives were
harder to pick. Dalla Bella provided detailed designs for the ladders needed
by olive pickers, and suggested employing women and children for this
work, as they could be paid half the wage of men and did not ask for wine.54
Calabria, Provence, and Languedoc a woman’s pay for a working day was one-fourth of
a man’s.
55. Dalla Bella, Memórias e observações, 24.
56. For Apulia. see Ricchioni (n. 46 above), 230. Similarly, in Portugal small propri-
etors and lagareiros (oil millers) became “staunch enemies” of the new practice (Dalla
Bella, Memórias e observações, 30, 43).
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Pruning methods also changed to facilitate the harvest; trees needed to
remain short.55
Similarly, reformers decried the practice of leaving olives to ferment
after they had been harvested, common all over the Mediterranean, as irra-
tional. Traditional mills included large storage facilities—the zimboni in
Calabria, the camini in Apulia, the tulhas in Portugal—where the fruits fer-
mented for weeks or even months before being processed. One reason for
this practice was that fermented olives were easier to crush and press, a cru-
cial matter in regions lacking waterpower. The scattered distribution of tra-
ditional mills was another; in years of rich harvest the working season
could extend well into the spring. Reformers tended to portray the practice
of fermentation as an imposition by feudal landlords on peasants, but in
fact it was a common belief that fermented olives contained more oil than
fresh ones. The strongest opposition to the new harvesting routine came
not from feudal masters but from millers, peasants, and tenant farmers.56
Many traditional mills, designed for fully ripe olives, proved unequal to
the task of crushing fresh ones; hence the reformers’ argument that they
were technically inferior. Redesigning the millstones around the need to use
fresh olives, however—increasing the size of the millstone, tapering it from
center to edge, and modifying the dormant stone—precipitated other
changes to the structure of the mill. Axles and pivots could not bear the
weight of the new stones, and therefore had to be reinforced with metal
parts and massive masonry. Also, traditional sources of power could no
longer drive the stone effectively. Grimaldi complained about the Calabrian
habit of using mules instead of horses, and Bernard suggested using two or
four animals to drive a single stone. Whenever possible, waterwheels were
the preferred solution, but here too traditional designs had to be discarded.
Vertical wheels replaced horizontal ones placed under the basin of the mill,
preventing water from cooling the basin and hence increasing the effective-
ness of the crushing action. A vertical wheel was more powerful than a hor-
izontal one of equal size and could drive two millstones at once.
At least one other factor lies behind the eighteenth-century quest to pro-
duce more powerful oil mills. The critique of traditional technology
depended not only on the new requirement that oil mills process fresh olives
but also on the different answer reformers gave to this question: What is the
proper measure of effectiveness with respect to extracting oil from olives? In
feudal-communal systems olives were judged properly milled and pressed
when all the edible oil had been extracted plus some oil of inferior quality,
57. Certain parts of the oil machines, like the basin of the mill, were specifically
designed to capture oil, olive paste, and pits during the manufacturing process. On the
economic relevance of olive remnants and their possible uses see Françoise Hilde-
sheimer, “L’huile, object de fiscalité en Provence sous l’Ancien Régime,” Provence his-
torique 31 (1981): 127–52, and Philippe Magnan de Bornier, Huile et grignons a Nyons,
XVIe–XVIIIe siècle (Nyons, 1985).
58. Grimaldi claimed that the procedure of washing olive remnants was invented in
Genoa “not more than fifty years ago” and described it carefully; Istruzioni (n. 13 above),
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which required the use of boiling water. The miller kept the remnants of the
olive paste, which constituted a relevant part of his earnings. Profit was
made out of the marc left in the mill as well as in the press: without it, the
traditional mill would have been a loss-making investment. In this context,
searching for methods to extract the last drop of oil was a meaningless
task.57 But the reformers addressed a new kind of proprietor, an individual
who held full title to his land and his machines. This figure was slowly
emerging, thanks to the practice of enclosure and the decline of common
and ecclesiastical lands. Ideally, the proprietor owned the mill and processed
his own harvest or fruit bought from peasants. He had no incentive to leave
a drop of oil in the olive remnants, or to lose anything at any stage of the
manufacturing process—quite the opposite. Modern production methods
should leave nothing but dry and compact fibers, which could at most be
used as fuel. The newly invented Genoese practice of washing the remnants
in a series of interconnected basins (fig. 2) to collect oil particles had been
conceived in obedience to the logic of private ownership of machinery.58
FIG. 2 Interconnected basins for washing the olive remnants. (François Rozier,
“Vues économiques sur les moulins et pressoirs a l’huile d’olives, connus en
France ou en Italie,” Observations sur la physique, sur l’histoire naturelle et 
sur les arts 8 [1776]: 417–43.)
119–30. Dalla Bella presented it as “a new and useful invention,” which would in-
crease the “profit of the particulars”; Memórias e observações (n. 13 above), xi, 106–7.
59. Casanova, Paysans et machines (n. 5 above), 246–48.
60. Presta (n. 13 above), 457.
61. On the politics of eighteenth-century disciplinary methods and their analytical
nature, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York,
1979), 135–69.
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Similar considerations can explain many of the technical changes in
olive presses. As we have seen, at midcentury various technological options
were available, with beam presses being the most common. The need to
press a paste of fresh olives, and to press the last drop of oil out of it, cre-
ated a corresponding need to increase the force exerted by the press. The
wooden central screw press was a powerful but somewhat fragile option;
the great forces exerted on the paste were also exerted on the press frame
itself. The solution was to replace wood with iron, as suggested by Bernard.
He also recommended that Provençal entrepreneurs build a series of four
to six central screw presses, placed in niches inside a great masonry struc-
ture (pressoir à chargement). Similarly, Presta advised Apulian proprietors
to carve niches in the rock of the underground trappeti and place Genoese
presses there. Masonry and rock provided tremendous structural strength,
sufficient to resist the increased force created by the screw.
Meanwhile, the beam press was rapidly abandoned by entrepreneurs.
To be sure, longer levers and additional capstans or counterweights did
increase the power of beam presses, but in the late eighteenth century this
design evolution reached its structural limits. The consequences of a giant
lever suddenly freed by the rupture of a capstan or a rope were spectacular
and devastating. By the 1780s the beam press, though it survived in periph-
eral areas of the Mediterranean world, was just another example of the old
way of doing things.59
Mechanize and Discipline
The new mills depended upon a crucial additional development: in-
creasing the workload of laborers. A mechanized mill demanded longer
hours and fewer breaks.60 The continuous, regular, and synchronized func-
tioning of the new machines required a new and more intense kind of
work. Technological innovation could succeed only where the local work-
force could be effectively disciplined to its new role.61
Disciplining the workforce was in itself a highly desirable goal for the
struggling bourgeois elites of southern Europe. Social tensions mounted in
the rural world as commercial agriculture and the privatization of common
land increasingly disrupted traditional ways of life. This conflict was not
peculiar to the Mediterranean regions, but they seem to have experienced
62. Note, for instance, that in spite of the generalized increase in prices between 1750
and 1800, the wages of day laborers remained basically stable in southern Italy and in
Spain. The average daily wage for a Neapolitan worker employed in wine making or oil
production was around twenty-five grani; women and boys would not have received
more than ten grani. These wages remained unchanged between the 1740s and the early
nineteenth century, while the price of grain and oil doubled; the price of oil for lamps,
for instance, rose from ten to twenty-three grani per kilogram. Ruggiero Romano,
“Prezzi, salari e servizi a Napoli nel secolo XVIII (1734–1806),” in Romano (n. 52 above),
159–264. See also Earl J. Hamilton, War and Prices in Spain, 1651–1800 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1947), 204–16, and Pierre Vilar, La Catalogne dans l’Espagne Moderne (Paris,
1962), 2:332–418.
63. On the shapeless landscape, see Emilio Sereni, History of the Italian Agricultural
Landscape (Princeton, N.J., 1997). The case of oil manufacture demonstrates that the
rationalization of labor and the disciplining of the workforce appeared in these regions
long before the advent of the modern factory. For similar considerations relative to North
America, see Sharon Salinger, “Artisans, Journeymen and the Transformation of Labor in
Late-Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia,” William and Mary Quarterly 40 (1983): 62–84;
Cynthia Shelton, “The Role of Labor in Early Industrialization: Philadelphia, 1787–1837,”
Journal of the Early Republic 4 (1984): 365–94; Gail Fowler Mohanty, “Experimentation in
Textile Technology, 1788–1790, and Its Impact on Handloom Weaving and Weavers in
Rhode Island,” Technology and Culture 29 (1988): 1–31. There is a rich literature on the
disciplining of the workforce in Britain and America, mostly based on nineteenth-century
evidence. See Sidney Pollard, “Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution,” Economic
History Review 16 (1963): 254–71; Keith Thomas, “Work and Leisure,” Past and Present 29
(1964): 50–66; E. P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” Past
and Present 38 (1967): 56–97; Herbert Gutman, “Work Culture and Society in Indus-
trializing America 1815–1919,” in Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America:
Essays in American Working-Class and Social History (New York, 1976), 3–78; Merritt Roe
Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca,
N.Y., 1977); and Jonathan Prude, The Coming of the Industrial Order: Town and Factory
Life in Rural Massachussetts, 1810–1860 (New York, 1983).
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it with particular intensity.62 Consequently, the late-eighteenth-century
agricultural and social landscape of Mediterranean Europe became, as an
observer put it, “shapeless.” Politically underrepresented and economically
squeezed between feudal reaction and an unruly peasantry, the progressive
southern bourgeoisie eagerly sought to create new bonds of trust and sub-
ordination that could replace the traditional ones. Among their aims in
pursuing technological change, then, was the disciplining of the recalcitrant
Mediterranean peasant-worker.63
Grimaldi often criticized the organization of labor in the traditional
trappeti. Bernard found it irrational that the different phases of the pro-
ductive process were not synchronized, leaving plenty of wasted moments
in the laborers’ working day: they would be drinking in the nearby village
as olives fermented in the containers. The traditional organization of labor
reflected the fact that those working in oil mills were not skilled workers
but temporarily hired peasants, directed by an experienced chief miller. In
the winter months, when other demands of farm work slackened, men and
64. Consider, for instance, that in traditional oil manufacture the chief miller was
responsible for deciding when the olives were ready to be milled and pressed. Typically
he would stick his arm in a container filled with fermented fruits to essay their oiliness.
In the modern manufacture this decision rested solely with the entrepreneur, who deter-
mined when the olives should be harvested and had them immediately processed.
65. Presta (n. 13 above), 458. That resistance to the new practices was strong in
southern Apulia is not surprising, as large-scale oil milling had a secular tradition there.
The chief miller was a highly respected figure, and was called nocchiero (sea captain)—
the mill being his subterranean vessel and the workers his crew (ciurma). He was also
invested with a particular religious authority, as he was responsible for the spiritual life
of workers during the long periods underground. The chief miller guaranteed that work-
ing hours were properly interrupted for prayer and meditation, which he guided. See Q.
Scozzi, Un paese del sud: Melissano. Storia e tradizioni popolari (Matino, 1981), 122.
66. Casanova, Techniques (n. 5 above), 317–20.
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women alike might earn extra money by a few hours a day at the oil mill or
press. This kind of labor, either paid or rendered as a corvée, made sense in
the context of a self-sufficient feudal or communal economy. But it created
problems for an entrepreneur aiming to produce large quantities of low-
acidity oil. Relying on the unskilled and discontinuous labor of peasants
meant that processing the harvest required a long time, that new machines
could not be used efficiently, and—most important—that traditional fig-
ures like the chief miller would preserve their discretion and authority, pre-
cluding the implementation of new practices.64 Presta advised Apulian
landlords bluntly: “Before admitting the workers and their chief, which we
call Nochiero [sic], to your service, call them and explain the way in which
you want to be served; [if they do] otherwise, it is convenient to order them
what to do with harsh words, or even fire them, as the canon Signor Can-
tore Piccioli did in the 1787 season, and with great profit indeed, as after-
wards he had eighteen loads done every week with just four presses.”65
Workers opposed the new production regime. In 1768, when Grimaldi
first sent some Genoese machines to his Calabrian estate, he had to hire
approximately twenty well-disciplined Genoese laborers as well, and send
them southward with their families. Calabrian peasants seemed unable or
unwilling to work in the new mills. Provençal entrepreneurs trying to set up
mechanized oil mills in Corsica reported similar difficulties; peasants hired
as casual day-laborers seemed unable to make the new machines work
properly, and often enough entrepreneurs could not find any available
laborers at all. In 1776 a French entrepreneur complained that manpower
was scarce in Corsica, leaving oil mills in the hands of a few peasant
women. They worked only during the day and that at a slow, irregular pace,
in contrast to his Provençal mills, where brigades of men alternated at the
machines around the clock.66
To have an idea of the kind of work entrepreneurs began to ask for, let
us consider briefly the operation of a mechanized oil mill equipped with a
battery of central-screw presses (fig. 3). Ideally, the plant included two
67. Presta, 454–56.
68. Foucault (n. 61 above), 136. On the politics of automated machinery, see the
work of Simon Schaffer, particularly his essay “Enlightened Automata,” in The Sciences in
Enlightened Europe, ed. William Clark, Jan Golinski, Simon Schaffer (Chicago, 1999),
126–65.
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mills, powered by a single vertical waterwheel, and four or six presses.
These machines could process more than one batch of fruit at a time, olive
paste moving from one press to the other in an ordered sequence of press-
ings. To operate the mill twenty-four hours a day demanded a precise cho-
reography. The waterwheel gave continuity to the production process,
allowing labor to be distributed in the most effective and economic way.
The various steps in the process—first pressing, second pressing, third
pressing, and the washing of the olive remnants—followed each other so as
to keep each machine constantly in use. Presta calculated that, in a forty-
eight-hour period at an optimized Apulian mill, eight full loads of olives
would pour into the mill basin, one every six hours. “Nothing is more dam-
aging to a fully equipped oil mill than being at rest.”67
Disciplining the workforce served other purposes besides maximizing
output. It was also the concrete epitome of a new social order that the bour-
geoisie sought to impose upon the shapeless remains of the feudal world, a
microcosm of the new rural community.68 The absence of such order as-
tonished Grimaldi and the French entrepreneurs in Calabria and Corsica,
and similar concerns underpinned Dalla Bella’s call for the creation of new
bonds of trust between modern entrepreneurs, chief millers, and peasants.
For the southern bourgeoisie, the failure of technology transfer in vast
areas of southern Europe was a troubling symptom of deeper resistance to
the enlightened new order. Consider the case of Calabria. The conditions of
life of peasants and tenant farmers were rapidly deteriorating due to the
FIG. 3 Battery of single-screw presses from an Apulian mill. (Antonio Monte,
L’antica industria dell’olio [Lecce, 2003]. Courtesy of Il Grifo Edizioni.)
69. On the complex social dynamics of the 1799 insurrection, see John Davies,
“Rivolte popolari e controrivoluzione nel mezzogiorno continentale,” Studi storici 39
(1998): 603–22. On the worsening socioeconomic conditions of the southern Italian
peasantry, see Pasquale Villani, Mezzogiorno tra riforme e rivoluzione (Bari, 1974); Gae-
tano Cingari, Giacobini e sanfedisti in Calabria nel 1799 (Reggio Calabria, 1979); and
Anna Maria Rao, Pasquale Villani, Napoli 1799–1815: Dalla repubblica alla monarchia
amministrativa (Naples, 1995).
70. On workers’ opposition to mechanization as a form of resistance to structural
social and economic change, see Adrian Randall, “The Philosophy of Luddism: The Case
of the West England Woolen Workers, ca. 1790–1809,” Technology and Culture 27 (1986):
1–17.
71. Resistance was structurally possible because of the persistence of feudal-com-
munal activities and resources. It should be noted that even where the feudal communal
system was less pervasive, as in Apulia, bracciali and lavoratori (day laborers) were rarely
registered as nullatenenti (propertyless). In most cases they would own a house or of part
of it, a parcel of land, sometimes a few animals. See Vincenzo Ricchioni, Studi storici di
economia dell’agricoltura meridionale (Florence, 1952), 5–70.
72. In 1775 the monks of San Martino di Lota mechanized their mill, only to dis-
cover that they could find no laborers. The peasant women in charge of picking olives 
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combined effects of feudal reaction and the commercial speculations of
merchants and great landowners. During the years of war with revolution-
ary France the situation came to a head and, under the banner of Catholic
counterrevolution, an unprecedented peasant insurrection took place in
1799, which contemporaries called “the great anarchy.” Peasants rose in arms
to slaughter the landlords and sack the cities. This time it was not feudal cas-
tles they set on fire but the city houses of the gentiluomini (gentlemen), the
new bourgeois proprietors à la Grimaldi—those who supported the philo-
sophical principles of the Enlightenment, the political ideals of the French
Revolution, and the rational management of mechanized production.69
Technology Transfer
A mechanized oil mill depended on the proprietor-entrepreneur’s con-
trol of the entire productive process, which implied among other things the
power to strip chief millers of their traditional authority and discretion and
to impose new patterns of discipline upon the rest of the workforce. Wher-
ever financial and entrepreneurial elites could realize these conditions, as in
the trading centers of the Italian and French Rivieras, new oil technology
flourished and further technical innovations (the hydraulic press, the mul-
tistone mill) followed.
Where shared machinery, common land, and parceled property re-
mained predominant, however, those necessary conditions did not prevail.
In Corsica, Portugal, and Calabria peasant-workers saw new production
methods as threats to their very way of life.70 And where they could count
on other marginal economic activities, they were able to resist.71 Thus, in
Corsica opening a mechanized mill was a doomed financial enterprise.72 By
were not willing to increase their workload. In 1777 the monks paid twelve sous for a
working day; one woman harvested, on average, one bacino of olives per day; the quan-
tity of oil obtained from one bacino had a market value of around twelve sous. In the
short run, then, for the monks the new technology was a loss-making investment. See
Casanova, Paysans et machines (n. 5 above), 345–46.
73. Dalla Bella, Memórias e observações (n. 13 above), 127.
74. An example of the ways bourgeois investors and great landowners could profit 
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the end of the century only a few foreign producers who owned plants on
the coast and could import their own workforce were using the new oil-
production technology on the island. Similarly, in Portugal reformers failed
to overcome the resistance of the traditional chief millers.73 By 1790 their
day had passed, and Dalla Bella was back in Padua. Mills with a single lever-
and-screw press, family owned and operated, remained common in Portu-
gal into the twentieth century, adequately meeting the needs of each vil-
lage’s small producers to transform their harvest into common oil destined
for local consumption.
Opposition to the new production methods came from other quarters
as well. The limited availability of a disciplined workforce was simply one
aspect of a broader structural problem. In the feudal-communal context of
rural southern Europe, mechanized mills threatened an entire network of
interests that sustained and profited from the traditional organization of
labor. This was particularly evident in provinces like Calabria, where feudal
landlords still had enough power to increase the pressure on the peasantry
and protect their traditional rents.74 As for the plutocracy of oil merchants
FIG. 4 Genoese-style mill and press. (Domenico Grimaldi, Istruzioni sulla nuova
manifattura dell’olio introdotta nel Regno di Napoli [Naples, 1777].)
from traditional oil manufacture was the contratto alla voce. The most common form of
payment for olives all over southern Italy, this type of contract provided peasants and
tenant farmers with a cash advance for their oil production of the following year, at a
price to be fixed at the beginning of the harvest. This system favored speculation on the
part of great landowners and oil merchants, while leaving the peasantry to shoulder the
burden of increasing taxation and the risk of an unpredictable market. See Chorley (n.
41 above), 83–139, and Paolo Macry, “Ceto mercantile e azienda agricola nel Regno di
Napoli: Il contratto alla voce nel XVIII secolo,” Quaderni Storici 7 (1972): 851–909. For
a detailed study of a Calabrian feudal estate transformed into bourgeois property with-
out altering the overall mode of production, see Raul Merzario, Signori e contadini di
Calabria: Corigliano Calabro dal XVI al XIX secolo (Milan, 1975).
75. Furthermore, the bureaucracies and tax systems of the ancien régime tended to
penalize the establishment of mechanized mills, mostly by reducing profit margins on
olio fino and thereby discouraging investment in new technology. See Giuseppe Palmieri,
Osservazioni su vari articoli riguardanti la pubblica economia (Naples, 1790), and Chorley,
140–59.
76. On the weaknesses of the productive bourgeoisie and the failure of the eigh-
teenth-century reform movement in Calabria, see Augusto Placanica, Alle origini del-
l’egemonia borghese in Calabria: La privatizzazione delle terre ecclesiastiche, 1784–1815
(Salerno-Catanzaro, 1979), 307–428. Grimaldi ended up in jail in 1797, accused of being
a liberal freemason conspiring against the monarchy. His son was beheaded in Naples in
1799 as a leader of the republican movement. The parable of the Grimaldis epitomizes
the political radicalization of the Neapolitan bourgeoisie during the 1790s, when many
became convinced that only revolutionary, antimonarchical action could lead to the
modernization of southern society. The story of Domenico Grimaldi can be compared
with the successful careers of similar French figures, such as Bernard or Jean-Antoine
Chaptal. On Chaptal—a reformer, enlightened entrepreneur, freemason, and supporter
of a pragmatic conception of science—see Gough (n. 17 above), and Jeff Horn and Mar-
garet Jacob, “Jean-Antoine Chaptal and the Cultural Roots of the French Industrializa-
tion,” Technology and Culture 39 (1998): 671–98. On the notion of heterogeneous engi-
neering, see John Law, “Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of
Portuguese Expansion,” in Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (n. 3 above), 111–34.
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and absentee proprietors, they could speculate safely and profitably in tra-
ditional oil production and the trade in common oil with Marseilles.75
Grimaldi’s reform effort ended in failure. Although by the 1780s a few
Calabrian proprietors were using the new machinery, they were a distinct
minority. Grimaldi realized that his entire plan depended on strengthening
the medium-sized and small producers, who were too fragmented and
politically weak to press the government for support. In 1785 he tried to set
up an association (società economica) of Calabrian oil producers to lobby
for lower interest rates, tax reduction, and new contracts with oil mer-
chants. The failure of this project of heterogeneous engineering, which
aimed to reshape the social and technical landscape of which the oil mills
were part, precipitated Grimaldi’s own economic collapse.76
Meanwhile, in Apulia, where oil producers were better organized and
where feudal-communal land was slowly turning into bourgeois property
(often without changing hands), the new technology gained a partial
foothold. The presence of a redundant workforce and the rapid erosion of
77. Salvemini (n. 50 above), 66.
78. On these and later technical innovations in Apulian oil manufacture, see
Ricchioni, “Un pioniere forestiero” (n. 46 above).
79. See, for instance, Giovanni Battista Gagliardo, Catechismo agrario per uso de’cu-
rati di campagna e de’ fattori delle ville (1793; reprint, Lecce, 1990), 116, 118. On tech-
nology transfer, see Bruno Latour’s critique of the “model of diffusion” in Science in
Action (n. 3 above), 132–36. Other authors have emphasized the role of specific social
and economic conditions in explaining problems in technology transfer during the eigh-
teenth century. See, for instance, Edward Allen, “Business Mentality and Technology
Transfer in Eighteenth-Century France: The Calandre Anglaise at Nîmes, 1752–1792,”
History and Technology 8 (1990): 9–23; Dick van Lente, “Innovation in Paper Making:
The Netherlands 1750–1850,” History and Technology 14 (1998): 201–24; and Karel
Davids, “Successful and Failed Transitions: A Comparison of Innovation in Windmill
Technology in Britain and the Netherlands in the Early Modern Period,” History and
Technology 14 (1998): 225–47. See also Svante Lindqvist, Technology on Trial: The Intro-
duction of Steam Power Technology into Sweden, 1715–1736 (Stockholm, 1984).
MAZZOTTIK|KMechanizing Olive Oil Production
303
marginal economic activities undermined peasant-workers’ resistance.77
The hybrid nature of Apulian mills at the turn of the nineteenth century
nicely demonstrates the selective character of technology transfer. Apulian
proprietors invested in increasing the dimensions of subterranean mills
and the number of machines and animals in use. As their traditional mill-
stones were powerful enough to crush fresh olives efficiently, they concen-
trated on the mechanization of the presses, reorganizing that part of the
labor process and boosting output. Among the technical changes they
introduced were the replacement of Calabrian presses with batteries of cen-
tral screw presses set into the rock and the introduction of a winch to act
upon the screw.78 In place of a waterwheel, Apulian mill owners increased
their use of animal power, alternating oxen to keep the mill in continuous
operation. (Oxen were preferred over horses not only because they were
stronger but because of their more regular pace.)79
* * *
Traditional oil technology was shaped by the socioeconomic conditions
of the premodern world. Each component (millstone, basin, press) presup-
posed and sustained a specific process of labor and, more generally, a specific
network of social relations. As long as those conditions remained stable,
external demand for more and better olive oil was irrelevant. Mechanization
emerged in areas like the trading centers of Genoa and Provence, where
entrepreneurs reshaped machinery in the context of a global transformation
of the agricultural and social landscape. In this situation, traditional ma-
chines came to seem inefficient and uneconomic: they did not work any
longer. The failure to transfer modern technology to regions where tradi-
tional socioeconomic conditions still prevailed (Corsica, Portugal, Calabria),
and the partial success of such technology transfer to regions where these
80. See n. 5 above. For an example of straightforward technological determinism in
Italian historiography, see Franco Mastrolla, “Olivicultura e tecniche estrattive in Terra
d’Otranto nei secoli XVIII e XIX attraverso gli studi del Presta e del Moschettini,” Annali
del dipartimento di scienze storiche e sociali, Università degli Studi di Lecce 2 (1983):
245–58.
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conditions were in flux (Apulia), provide further evidence of the intrinsic
social dimension of technical change.
Recent works on oil-production machinery have largely reflected a
determinist view of technological progress.80 This study, in contrast, indi-
cates that highly mechanized oil mills and presses were not self-evident
technological goals. They appeared in the Mediterranean landscape as
emblems of a specific project of modernization, one supported by growing
portions of the southern elites, and their technical features were the con-
tingent outcome of negotiations over such issues as the nature of olive oil,
trade, control of the production process, the conditions of ownership of
land and machinery, work discipline and labor organization, and the forg-
ing of new power relations in southern European society.
